The effect of a supply shock in the production of cocaine on violence: Evidence from Colombia and Venezuela by Beeder, Monica
 
The effect of a supply shock in the production 
of cocaine on violence: Evidence from 










Master’s thesis handed in the 15th of June 2020 
Master’s Degree in Economics 











First, I want to thank my supervisor, Rune Jansen Hagen, for valuable guidance in writing this 
thesis. I thank my second supervisor, Eirik Andre Strømland, for helping me with the 
econometric methodology and analysis, for useful comments and advice, and for always being 
available to answer my endless series of questions. Without the two of you, I could never have 
finished this thesis.  
Furthermore, I want to thank Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) for accepting me as an affiliated 
master student and allowing me to be a part of an inspiring research environment. In particular, 
I would like to thank Magnus Hatlebakk for useful comments and encouragement.  
I like to thank Catalina Franco Buitrago at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) for 
helping me with data sources in Colombia.  
I would also like to thank Amanda Kvarven, Nina Serdarevic and, Ragnar Alne at the University 
of Bergen (UiB) for providing useful STATA tips and for taking the time to answer my many 
questions.  
In addition, I would like to thank my fellow students at the University of Bergen and at CMI 
for providing good company, exciting discussions, and entertaining coffee breaks.  
I would also like to thank Sigri Wind for proofreading and for giving valuable comments on 
my drafts.  
Finally, I would like to thank Siri Reinzt, Charlotte Ringdal, Anna Oleynik for useful comments 





Using data on coca cultivation and homicides, this paper analyzes an otherwise little researched 
topic, linking cocaine production and violence in Colombia. I use an exogenous supply shock 
in gasoline, an input factor needed to produce cocaine, and analyze the effect on violence in 
coca-producing areas compared to non-producing areas using a differences-in-differences 
strategy.  
The price of gasoline decreases in 2016, because of an exchange rate shock between Colombia 
and Venezuela. The results indicate that the positive supply shock leads to more violence in 
coca producing areas.  The main results are robust to various tests, such as controlling for 
immigration, excluding big cities and distance from the border.  
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that when it becomes cheaper to produce 
cocaine, there is more violence in production areas. By looking at a purely economic effect on 
the drug market, instead of a drug enforcement effect, the paper also show that there is an effect 
of price changes on the cocaine market that goes beyond the drug enforcement. The paper also 
contributes to the literature by studying the interaction between two illegal markets: the 
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Latin America is the world′s most violent region not at war, with 45 of the 50 most murderous 
cities in the world, and eight of the top 10 most murderous countries (Igarapé Institute 2017). 
In Colombia, interpersonal violence causes more premature deaths than heart disease and traffic 
accidents (Global Burden of Disease 2017).  One major mechanism thought to be behind the 
extensive violence is the prevalence of cocaine production throughout Colombia. 
Colombia is currently the most important cocaine producer (coca bush cultivation) in the world 
(United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2019). The most recent estimates show 
that the global production of cocaine reached an all-time high of 1,976 tons in 2017, which was 
more than double the level recorded in 2013. Coca cultivation in Colombia is the main driver 
of this increase. 
Despite the strong correlation, there is little research on the causal relationship between the 
cultivation, production, and trafficking of drugs in Latin America and the violence. Evidence 
from Afghanistan suggests that violence can lead to more drug production; hence, the direction 
of causality is unclear (Lind, Moene & Willumsen 2014). 95 percent of all scientific knowledge 
on effective violence prevention relates exclusively to the United States and wealthy European 
countries, where homicide rates are low (Eisner & Nivette 2012). Thus, more research is needed 
in low- and middle-income countries to advance local knowledge on the causes of violence 
(Eisner 2015).   
In this thesis, I study the relationship between violence and cocaine production in Colombia. I 
use an exogenous price shock in the cocaine market to study the effect on violence in cocaine-
producing areas.  The price shock originates from a shock to the exchange rate between the 
currencies of Colombia and Venezuela in 2016. In turn, this shock stems from hyperinflation 
in Venezuela caused by the decrease in international oil prices and poor monetary policy. The 
shock affects the price of an input into the cocaine production, trafficked gasoline. This shock 
allows a quasi-experimental research design to study the impact of the supply shock on 
violence. I perform a Differences-in-differences (DiD) analysis between areas with high-
intensity and low-intensity coca cultivation, assuming (and testing for) similar trends before 
and after the economic shock. I survey the existing literature about the cocaine production chain 
to assure that cocaine production and the input of gasoline, the variable of interest, are located 
in the areas of cultivation. I use data on coca cultivation and homicides, two reliable data 
sources in a field of research with many unknowns, and a general lack of information. The 
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results indicate that the positive supply shock leads to more violence in coca producing areas 
than in non-producing areas. Lastly, the paper discusses alternative mechanisms and find that 
the results are robust to various tests, as controlling for immigration, excluding big cities and 
distance from the border.   
This paper contributes to the literature by looking at the effects of a pure economic shock and 
by studying a supply shock instead of a demand shock. Most of the previous literature studies 
economic shocks that stem from law enforcement campaigns against drugs, and is studying 
change in demand. Both Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Mejia and Restrepo (2013) have studied 
demand shocks in the Colombian coca production as a consequence of drug enforcement 
campaigns. Abadie et al. (2014) have looked at the impact of drug eradication programs in 
Colombia. Castillo, Mejia, and Restrepo (2020) have studied the effects of a negative supply 
shock from drug enforcement in Colombia and the impact of violence along Mexican 
trafficking routes. Dell (2015) has examined areas in Mexico with vigorous drug enforcement.  
Drug enforcement is violent, and therefore it is challenging to distinguish the effect on violence 
from law enforcement campaigns from “pure” changes in demand. By looking at a pure 
economic shock on the drug market, instead of a drug enforcement intervention, one is more 
likely to establish a causal relationship where price changes affect the cocaine market, which 
in turn affects the level of violence.  Another contribution to the literature is to study a supply 
shock and show that when it becomes cheaper to produce cocaine, there is more violence in 
production areas. This knowledge is valuable for policies. Finally, the paper also contribute to 
the literature by studying the interaction between two illegal markets: the smuggling of gasoline 
and cocaine production.  
This rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. First, I give background information on cocaine 
production in Colombia, violence in Colombia, and the exchange rate shock and import of 
gasoline from Venezuela. Then, I look at related research and discuss the potential mechanism 
linking a price shock to cocaine production and violence. I argue that purely positive economic 
shocks to drug production will lead to more violence, even though no preexistence literature 
have studied it. Then, I describe the data before presenting my main analysis. This is followed 





2.1 Cocaine production in Colombia 
Cocaine is a natural product extracted from the leaves of Erythroxylum coca and Erythroxylum 
novogranatese, better known as coca leaves (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA) and Europol 2020). Coca leaves are almost exclusively cultivated in 
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. The extraction of cocaine alkaloids from the coca leaves also 
almost exclusively takes place in these three countries, and the majority of the global production 
of cocaine hydrochloride takes place in the same countries. Colombia is the major producer of 
the three countries, both in terms of coca leaves and cocaine production (UNODC 2019).    
To produce cocaine, the coca leaves go through various chemical processes. First, the coca 
leaves are cultivated and harvested. It is important to note that the leaf is marketed in a fresh 
state and is a perishable good, as the leaf tends to rot about two days after harvest (UNODC & 
Government of Colombia 2017). Then in the extraction process, the leaves are crushed with 
sulfuric, acid, calcium carbonate, and gasoline (EMCDDA and Europol 2020). The leaves are 
soaked in barrels of gasoline and then drained, which creates the coca (base) paste. Coca (base) 
paste has about one-hundredth of the volume of coca leaves, and the transition from leaf to 
paste is where most of the weight reduction in cocaine production occurs (Angrist and Kugler 
2008). Later, in the purification stage, potassium permanganate is added to the paste, and the 
resulting mixture is filtered, creating the cocaine base (EMCDDA and Europol 2020). Then, in 
the crystallization stage, Ammonium hydroxide, acetone, and hydrochloric acid are added to 
the cocaine base to create cocaine hydrochloride. Lastly, the cocaine hydrochloride is divided 
into user dosage and mixed (cut) with other ingredients. This last step is typically done in 
consumer countries. 
The first two stages, the cultivation and extracting, where the coca base paste is created, usually 
are taking place at the local farmer level (Mejia & Rico 2010).  Approximately 2/3 of the 
peasant coca growers do not directly sell the coca leaf but transform it through a relatively 
simple and artisanal process into coca paste, and then sell it as an input to large-scale cocaine 
producers (Mejia & Rico 2010). This thesis will focus on the second step, the extraction, where 
the gasoline is used. This process takes place close to the cultivation area for two reasons; the 
perishable nature of the leaves and the transportation cost. In order to produce the cocaine (base) 




There is no single method for producing cocaine, and many of the ingredients have substitutes 
(though they often contain the same core components that are necessary to create the chemical 
processes) (Mejia & Rico 2010; EMCDDA and Europol 2020). In the case of gasoline, the input 
of interest in this paper, it is possible to substitute with kerosene (paraffin) and oil. However, 
price and availability make gasoline the most common ingredient.  
Daniel Mejia and Daniel M. Rico have estimated the economics of the supply chain for 
producing cocaine based on the different chemicals needed in the process (2010). Even though 
the calculations are to be used with caution, as the researchers suggest, it gives a good indication 
of the ratios of the different inputs needed in the production. They estimate that to produce one 
kilogram of cocaine base, 382 liters of gasoline, 0.85 liters of Ammonia, 0.10 liters of Sulfuric 
Acid, 0.35 liters of Caustic Soda, 360 kg of Cement and 1.01 kg of Potassium permanganate 
are needed. When they adjust the estimation for prices of the different inputs they calculate that 
to produce one kilogram of base cocaine it costs (in Colombian pesos in 2008): 752,703 pesos 
for gasoline, 12,546 pesos for Ammonia, 2,318 pesos for Sulfuric Acid, 532 pesos for Caustic 
Soda, 189,000 pesos for Cement and 120,190 pesos for Potassium permanganate. Consequently 
about 70 % of the costs of these inputs (if one makes one kilogram) stem from the gasoline. 
Part of the gasoline used in the production is reusable, so for large scale operation, there are 
efficiency gains, where the gasoline can be about one fifth (22%) of the cost of chemicals. The 
estimations for gasoline are used with the prices from Colombia, and not from the smuggled 
gasoline.   
Gasoline is a relatively cheap ingredient. It is the quantity and location that makes it relevant. 
The amount needed in the production makes it an essential component in the production, also 
cost-wise. As it is used in the first steps of the production, it is an input for farmers that have 
small and unstable incomes to start with, making it a critical factor.  
As explained in the next chapter, earlier research has studied the effect of changes in demand 
for coca leaves on violence and finds significant results. Coca leaves are also relatively cheap; 
even though it is the only fundamental ingredient in cocaine, it also has a minor cost. In 2016, 
it was estimated that the average price of a kg of fresh coca leaves was 0.95 US dollars, while 
the average estimated price for a kg of cocaine paste was 621 US dollars, the average estimated 
price for a kg of cocaine base was 814 US dollars, and the average estimated price for a kg of 
cocaine hydrochloride (cocaine) was 1,633 US dollars (UNODC & Government of Colombia 
2017). Since earlier research has found significant effects of a price shock on coca leaves, which 
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seems to have a lower cost share, it should be possible to detect the effects of a price shock on 
gasoline. 
 
2.2 Shock to gasoline prices 
In neighboring country Venezuela, there is a highly subsidized gasoline market, intended for 
its inhabitants: everyone with a Venezuelan identity card can go to any gasoline station and buy 
gasoline for 1 bolivar/liter (El País Cali 2017; BBC 2018). The subsidy was implemented as 
one of the many services provided to the population at a time when Venezuela was a prosperous 
country due to its oil reserves. When former president Carlos Andres Perez tried to end gasoline 
subsidy in 1989, it caused a big riot (Pozzebon 2019). Therefore, this service has persisted 
through the country's political and economic turmoil because of Venezuela’s oil reserves.  
An unintended consequence of the subsidy is that many Colombians either travel themselves 
across the border to buy gasoline or buy smuggled cheap gasoline from Venezuela (BBC 2018, 
Joshua Collins 2019). Part of this smuggled gasoline is then used in Colombia to produce 
cocaine (see the chapter above on cocaine production) (Mejia & Rico 2010). The Venezuelan 
president has addressed this problem on various occasions, but with little effect (El País Cali 
2017; BBC 2018).  
Since the price of gasoline in Venezuela is fixed, the price for Colombians wanting to buy their 
gasoline will vary with the fluctuation in the currency between Colombian pesos and 
Venezuelan bolivars. When Venezuela was hit by hyperinflation, it became cheaper for 
Colombians to buy Venezuelan bolivars and gasoline from Venezuela. The closer to the 
Colombian border, the more expensive the gasoline becomes (El País Cali 2017). The price 
differences remain important even though different actors require payments along the different 
smuggling routes. The Initiative for Investigative Journalism in the Americas, of the 
International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) has reported on the increase in illegal import of 
gasoline due to hyperinflation in Venezuela (El País Cali 2017).  
11 
 
Figure 1 Exchange rate between Venezuelan Bolivar Fuerte Venezolano and 
Colombian Pesos 
 
Figure produced with data from the Central Bank of Colombia (2014-2018) 
Venezuela is an oil-exporting and import-dependent economy with repressed markets for 
foreign exchange and intermediate and consumption goods (Cerra 2016). The oil export 
earnings cover the primary source of foreign exchange, which are used to import various foods 
and consumer goods. Venezuelan authorities tightly regulates foreign exchange rates, and its 
system for rationing foreign exchange creates a repressed goods market for import. When the 
international oil prices fell in 2014, this led to a drop in oil revenues, which again led to a 
massive reduction in the provision of foreign exchange to importers. This, in turn, led to a sharp 
decrease in the supply of goods to retail markets that drove the rise in inflation well beyond 
money growth. Together with a system that allowed different businesses to buy US dollars at 
different exchange rates, these factors led to a surge in inflation and the black market premium 
that led to hyperinflation in Venezuela in 2016. 
The inflation led to a dramatic fall of the Venezuelan bolivar compared to Colombian pesos 
(and other currencies), as shown in Figure 1. The depreciation of the Venezuelan bolivar to 
Colombian pesos makes the illegal gasoline cheaper for Colombians, thus creating a shift in the 
cost of cocaine production in Colombia. As shown, the reduction in gasoline costs in Columbia 
were due to hyperinflation in Venezuela and not related to the Colombian cocaine market, and 
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uses this exogenous price shock on the cocaine market, to study the effect of the cocaine market 
on violence in cocaine-producing areas. 
 
2.3 Violence in Colombia 
Colombia has a long history of violence and civil wars since its independence in 1810 (Angrist 
and Kugler 2008). There were high levels of violence in Colombia long before they started 
producing and trafficking drugs. 
The country experienced six major civil wars during the 19th century, and during La Violencia 
from 1948 to 1957, more than 200,000 Colombians were killed (Angrist & Kugler 2008; Vargas 
& Caruso 2014). Drugs did not cause all violence in Colombia, but it does not mean that it did 
not perpetuate it. The incredibly high level of violence in the 1990s, when the homicide rate 
reached 70 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, coincided with a shift in coca cultivation towards 
Colombia (Mejia & Restrepo 2013). Below, in figure 2, the evolution of homicides in Colombia 
is graphed for the last 30 years (homicide rate is defined as homicide per 100,000). As one can 
see, the homicide rate is, on average, decreasing and has dramatically fallen since the early 
1990s. It is also possible to notice a small increase in the violence in the last years.   
 
Figure 2 Evolution of homicides in Colombia in the last 30 years 
 
Graph produced with data from UN Office on Drugs and Crime's International Homicide Statistics database, 






































































































































Most of the homicides in Colombia are committed with firearms coming from at least 20 
countries (Open Democracy 2017). Although the peace agreement in 2016 between Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the government, forced FARC to hand in 
(some of) their weapons, there is no reason to believe that there is any shortage of firearms in 
the country (Ray Mark Rinaldi 2019). 
 
3. Related research 
There is little research on cocaine markets, despite their importance (Storti, Grauwe & Reuter 
2011). Only in the E.U. it is estimated that 18 million adults have tried cocaine during their 
lives (EMCDDA and Europol 2020). Cocaine accounts for nearly one-third of the illicit market 
in drugs, which makes it the second-largest, after cannabis, and the global consumption is 
increasing.  There is also little research on the causal mechanisms between drug markets and 
violence. As Mejia and Restrepo (2013) point out: “Anecdotal evidence linking cocaine 
production to violence is not enough to establish a causal relation”.  
Most of the research on the topic studies the relationship between legal enforcement of 
interventions against drugs that may lead to shifts in the market and their effects on violence. 
Castillo, Mejia, and Restrepo (2020) have studied the impact of a negative supply shock for 
cocaine from drug enforcement in Colombia and the effect of violence in areas in Mexico that 
were used for trafficking drugs into the U.S. They found that Mexican cartel violence increased 
in periods of reduced cocaine supply caused by Colombian government seizures. Dell (2015) 
shows that in areas with vigorous drug enforcement caused by a shift in political leaders, there 
was an increase in violence (homicide rate) in Mexico. Abadie et al. (2014) looked at the effects 
of drug eradication programs in Colombia on violence and found that the eradications led to 
more violence in the short and long-term. Both Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Mejia and 
Restrepo (2013) have studied demand shocks in the Colombian coca production as a 
consequence of drug enforcement and its effect on violence and find that enforcement that leads 
to higher demand for coca leaves in Colombia, generates more violence. Mejia and Restrepo 
(2013) studied the effect of shifts in demand for cocaine in the U.S. on violence in Colombia. 
Since these shifts in demand occurred at the same time as Plan Colombia, the largest law 
enforcement intervention against drugs in the western hemisphere, it is unclear if their estimates 
capture the shift in demand or just the shift in drug enforcement. As drug enforcement is violent 




As there is no research, that I am aware of, that looks at a purely economic shock to illegal 
markets and its effect on violence, it is relevant to investigate the literature on legal commodities 
and examine the link between price shocks and violence. In the last 10 to 15 years, this literature 
has changed from analyzing one homogenous effect at a country level to the micro-level and 
studying the underlying mechanisms, where research points out several competing mechanisms 
might dominate under different circumstances (Rigterink 2020). Therefore, there is no clear 
positive or negative correlation between price shocks, income, and violence. 
Dube and Vargas (2013) have looked at how income shocks affect armed conflict and violence, 
with a focus on Colombia. They show that two different mechanisms can lead to opposite 
effects. The first is the opportunity cost effect, which exhibits a negative relationship between 
income shocks and violence. The second is the rapacity effect that shows a positive relationship 
between income shocks and violence. If prices for a labor-intensive natural resource increase, 
the wages for its worker should rise, which would lead to an upward shift in income for the 
households, which would increase the opportunity cost of conflict and recruitment to illegal 
actives (Dal Bo and Dal Bo 2011). However, the rapacity mechanism, also called "natural 
resources as a prize" or "greed," would raise the return to conflict related to natural resources 
since there is more money to be earned (Rigterink 2020). 
There are different theories on what makes the various mechanisms dominant (Dal Bo and Dal 
Bo 2011, Dube and Vargas 2013, Rigterink 2020). However, for an illegal good like coca, the 
mechanisms should work in the same direction, at least for a positive shock. Parallel to the 
opportunity cost effect, a positive shock to the coca market would increase the household 
income from coca and give them the incentive to join these illegal actives, which can cause 
more violence. For the rapacity effect, a positive shock to the coca market would increase the 
incentives to overtake production that belongs to others, either vertically (by taking over more 
of the production chain) or horizontally (by taking over coca leaves farms from others). The 
rapacity mechanism often leads to turf wars between the gangs (Lessing 2015). It is even 
possible that the two mechanisms might reinforce each other. If the opportunity cost leads more 
people into the market, and with more workers in the market, their greed may lead them to take 
over different areas. Or if farmers earn more on the production, they can afford to do more of 
the production themselves, and thereby increase their income, which again can lead to more 
violence. In conclusion, a positive supply shock that results from cheaper gasoline should likely 





My dataset includes data on the cultivation and production of coca and cocaine, data on 
violence, and data on exchange rates between Colombia and Venezuela. 
4.1 Data on cultivation and production   
To estimate the causal effect of cocaine production on violence, I would ideally use data on 
cocaine production; however, the information on cocaine production is not available since it is 
an illegal industry. Fortunately, I use can data on coca production, which is an indirect way to 
measure the effects of cocaine production. As mentioned in 2.1 Cocaine production in 
Colombia, the first stages of the cocaine production take place physically close by the 
cultivation areas. 
The optimal data source on the coca cultivation would have been the Integrated Monitoring 
System of Illicit Crops (SIMCI) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
SIMCI is a satellite-based monitoring system that estimates the extension of coca crops 
annually (Abadie et al. 2014). It uses satellite imagery of Colombia, and based on these satellite 
pictures, SIMCI experts will geo-reference the area that they interpret as coca producing, based 
on visual inspection. Then these areas interpreted as coca producing are confirmed via high 
definition photographs through helicopter flights. Unfortunately, I did not get access to these 
data in time1. Instead, I use seizure data. The problem with seizure data is that it might not be 
perfectly correlated with the actual cultivation data. The police might not always do big seizures 
in areas with large cultivation either because of fear of violent confrontation or because of 
corruption. Since Colombia has access to good quality data on coca cultivation, it is still likely 
that the police do seizures regularly in areas with a high density of cultivation. I have verified 
that all the top producing municipalities are part of the seizure data. Consequently, the 
correlation should be high between the two datasets. A preliminary study of the geo-referenced 
data shows that nearly all municipalities in the treatment group had cultivation in 2016 and 
2018. 
The data I use is at a yearly level, and the data is at the municipality level. In Colombia, there 
are 1,123 municipalities grouped into 33 departments. Municipalities are analogous to counties 
in the U.S., whereas departments are analogous to states (Dube & Vargas 2013). 
 
                                                          
1 It will be interesting, in the future, to check whether my findings are robust to this type of data. 
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4.2 Data on violence  
My main dependent variable is the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants from 2010 through 
2019, which is constructed from homicide data from National Police Statistical Contravention 
Crime and Operational Information System - SIEDCO. The data provide information on the 
cause, location, circumstance of death, date, gender, and age. I use municipality-level 
population projections to compute death rates based on the National Census of 1985 and 2020 
from the Colombian National Statistics Department (DANE). 
Homicides are often used as a proxy for violence because it is highly correlated with other 
violence and are accurately measured (Soares 2004). I use the normalized variable, homicides 
per 100,000 inhabitants, as this is the most common practice and allows for comparison across 
time and space. 
 
4.3 Data on exchange rates 
I use official currency data on exchange rates between Colombia and Venezuela from the 
Colombian Central Bank (Banco de la República Colombia 2020) to model the price shock. I 
use Colombian pesos for Colombia and Bolívar Fuerte Venezolano for Venezuela. Venezuela 
has several currencies due to their high inflation. I use Bolívar Fuerte Venezolano because it 
was the official currency from 2008 until August of 2018. The price shock, as one can see in 






5. Identification strategy: Differences-in-differences design  
I will estimate the effect of the cocaine price shock on violence. However, it is challenging to 
estimate causal effects on violence in a country like Colombia due to the high number of 
instability factors (war, peace processes, economic instability, and income inequality). Many 
factors can affect violence, and drugs do not cause all violence. Therefore, I use the differences-
in-differences (DiD) design to exploit the geographic variation in coca cultivation intensity. I 
also exploit exogenous time variation in gasoline prices, an input in the cocaine production 
induced by a currency shock between Venezuela and Colombia. The strategy is similar to the 
one Dube and Vargas (2013) use to look at the effects of economic shocks and change in 
violence in Colombia for legal goods, and the one Sviatschi (2018) uses to estimate the impact 
of a demand shock for coca leaves on children's long-term outcomes in Peru.   
There is a high concentration of coca cultivation within a few areas in Colombia, and this was 
also the case in 2016 when the gasoline price shock occurred (UNDOC 2017, 2019). The 
concentration of cultivation is shown on the map below (Map 1). The map displays the coca 
cultivation by share of land area covered by coca plants, with darker colors indicating a higher 
density of coca cultivation. One can easily see the concentration of coca cultivation; there are 
relatively small areas in colors, and only a few places are represented by dark blue, which 
indicates a high concentration of coca crop cultivation. The high concentration of coca in a few 
areas make the scenario suitable for a difference-in-differences (henceforth referred to as DiD) 
analysis, where one compares the changes in violence in the "treated" areas where there is a 
high concentration of coca cultivation with the areas with low (or no) cultivation of coca. The 
areas with a high concentration of coca cultivation will be the treatment group that will be 
affected by the price shock, while the areas with low coca cultivation will be the control group. 
The map only shows the cultivation areas and not the production plants. These areas are also 










Map 1 Coca cultivation in Colombia in 2016 
 
Notes: The darker blue color indicates high density of coca cultivation and one can observe that the cultivation is 
highly concentrated in a few areas. Map produced with data from Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia. 
Formally, the Differences-in-Differences (DiD) model may be expressed as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼3𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖  +  𝛽(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡)  + 𝜆𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
Where the subscript i specify the municipality, and t represents time measured in years. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is 
the homicide rate of municipality i in year t and is the outcome variable of interest. treat is the 
treatment variable taking the value 1 if the municipality is in the treatment group (with high 
cultivation of coca) and 0 if the municipality is in the control group (low cultivation of coca). 
Post is a binary variable taking the value 0 if the year is 2010 to 2015 and the value 1 if the year 
is 2016 to 2019 since the shock happened in 2016. 𝜆𝑡is a vector of year-fixed effects, and 𝛼𝑖 is 
the municipality fixed effect. Like Dube and Vargas (2013), I employ the municipality fixed 
effects to control for time-invariant municipal characteristics that may be correlated with 
economic conditions that may affect the conflict outcome. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a time-varying error term.  
The coefficient of interest, 𝛽 measures the average causal effect of the positive price shock in 
gasoline prices on the outcome variable, homicide rate. The identifying assumption is that the 
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change in the outcome variable would have been the same in both the treatment and control 
group in the absence of the price shock. 𝛽, our parameter of interest, estimates the average 
change in violence for municipalities that produce coca compared with municipalities that do 
not produce coca.  
To avoid overstating the precision of the estimates, I cluster standard errors (Cameron & Miller 
2015). I cluster standard errors at the department level to account for potential serial correlation 
over time and across municipalities within a department in violence. Although the treatment 
status is at the municipality level, I believe there can be a correlation within departments, so I 
cluster at the department level. Dube and Vargas (2013) do the same when studying the effects 
of different price shocks on other commodities on violence in Colombia. There are 33 
departments in Colombia. There is no clear consensus on the exact number of clusters needed; 
some may say 33 is enough and others suggest  that less than 42 is too little (Angrist & Pischke 
2008). The problem is that cluster-robust standard errors are potentially downward biased with 
a small number of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach & Miller 2008).  Therefore, I also use wild 
cluster bootstrap, a strategy that has been shown to perform well with small numbers of clusters.   
 
 
Definition of treatment and control groups 
I define the treatment status based on coca cultivation. Specifically, I define the treatment status 
based on coca cultivation status in the years before the shock in 2016. I define the treatment 
group as the municipalities that had registered coca cultivation all the 4 years before the shock. 
This definition implies a treatment group of 76 municipalities, while the control group is the 
remaining 971 municipalities (see Appendix B for the list of municipalities). After the main 






6. Results  
6.1 Graphical representations 
Figure 3 graphs the trends, including the pre-trends, for the homicide rate by treatment and 
control group. An important assumption for the DiD design to hold, is the assumption of a 
parallel trend between the treatment and control groups before the shock (Angrist & Pischke 
2009). The assumption is that in the absence of a shock, the two groups would continue with a 
parallel trend; this is impossible to test since one cannot see the counterfactual outcome. The 
estimated treatment effect relies on the assumption of parallel trends. The graph shows a parallel 
trend before the shock in 2016 (indicated by the red vertical line). The graph also indicates 
distinct developments in the treatment and control groups after the shock in 2016. Whereas the 
mean homicide rate (homicide per 100,000) in the treatment group increases after the shock, 
the mean homicide rate in the control group is stable after the shock until 2018, where it also 
increases. 





6.2 Main findings  
Below in table 1, are the main results from the DiD analysis. I present the results with and 
without the different fixed effects and the standard errors clustered at the municipality level and 
department level. The standard errors become bigger once I start clustering at a higher level, 
and consequently, the results become less significant. The main result is displayed in column 6 
and shows a positive statistically significant effect of 12.34, which is robust across all 
specifications. The wild clustering of the standard errors shows similar results, with a p-value 
of 0.03 versus 0.024 in the main analysis where I cluster at the department level (see appendix 
A). The result indicates that, on average, the impact of the shock in the treatment group (the 
areas with high cultivation) is an increase of 12.34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Even for 
a violent country like Colombia, the number is quite high. The average homicide rate in the 
whole sample is about 26 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, which implies that the effect of 
the supply shock is equivalent to a 50% increase in the number of murders in the average 
municipality. The parameter has a positive sign, suggesting that the positive supply shock to 
cocaine production (the drop in the price of imported gasoline) leads to more killings as 
hypothesized.  
 
Table 1 Differences-in-differences analysis of the effect of the price shock on homicide rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
DiD 12.34** 12.34** 12.34** 12.34** 
 (5.459) (5.461) (5.461) (5.469) 
Constant 23.46*** 23.27*** 25.23*** 44.45*** 
 (3.760) (3.384) (2.232) (2.294) 
     
Observations 11,220 11,220 11,220 11,220 
Number of muni 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
Municipality FE NO NO YES NO 
Year FE NO YES YES YES 
Department FE NO NO NO YES 
Cluster Department Department Department Department 
     
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.3 Alternative graphical representation 
Below, in Figure 4, I have graphed the developments for the treatment and control groups using 
an alternative technique. The graph presents the difference in the change in the average 
homicide rate in the treatment and the control group from one year to another, and one can see 
that for the first years the change is small and not significantly different from zero, while after 
2016 there is a larger and significant positive change in the treatment group. The graph confirms 
the parallel trend shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 4 Alternative graphical representation 
 
 
6.4 Placebo test 
I have run a differences-in-differences placebo test. The idea with a placebo test is to pretend 
that the shock happened earlier than it happened. One can thus "test" the untestable parallel 
trend assumption, which is necessary for the DiD design (Gertler 2016). The DiD design relies 
on the idea that in the absence of the shock (treatment), the treatment and control groups would 
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continue to move in parallel. This assumption is impossible to test for, as we will never see the 
counterfactual (which in this case would be the absence of the price shock in 2016). It is still 
possible to test the validity of the parallel trend assumption with a placebo test. 
A placebo test is run by using data from the pre-shock period between 2010 and 2015. For the 
different placebo estimations, I will assume that the shock happens in another year than the 
actual shock. In the first estimation, I assume the shock was in 2011, in the second estimation, 
I assume the shock was in 2012 and so forth. Commonly, the placebo test uses one point in time 
for the test, however here I have done a placebo test for all available time points. 
If there were significant effects in the placebo test, the parallel trend assumption would not be 
valid. Below in Table 2, one can see the results of the placebo tests. Standard errors are clustered 
at the department level. The placebo tests show no significant effects at a 5 or 1 % level. 2014 
and 2015 only show a statistically significant effect at the 10 % level and with the opposite sign 
of the main findings. The negative sign reflects the drop we see for homicides for the treatment 
group before the price shock. As illustrated in Figure 3 this small drop is not likely to affect my 
findings. The wild clustered errors show no statistically significant effect (see Appendix A). 
 
Table 2 Differences-in-differences placebo-estimation 













      
DiD 0.692 1.251 -1.512 -4.330* -5.440* 
 (4.255) (2.550) (2.450) (2.542) (3.077) 
Constant 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 
 (1.616) (1.616) (1.618) (1.619) (1.618) 
      
Observations 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 
Number of 
muni 
1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
Municipality 
FE 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Department Department Department Department Department 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 





7. Potential threats to the Differences-in-differences design 
7.1 Immigration from Venezuela 
One potential threat to the validity of the differences-in-differences design (DiD), is the 
increasing immigration from Venezuela to Colombia. The assumption for DiD to hold is that 
the treatment group and the control group would have experienced identical trends in the 
absence of the treatment, and migration from Venezuela could invalidate this assumption.  
In the data, there is an increase in the number of Venezuelans that are victims of homicide. In 
2010-2012, the number of Venezuelans killed was less than 20, in 2017, the number jumped to 
80, and in 2019, 439 were reported killed. The concern is not that these homicides would bias 
the results, as they constitute only 0.62 % of the murders, and it is possible to remove them 
from the data. The concern is that the Venezuelans might be victims of crime and also cause 
crimes since they are vulnerable, with little money, escaping a difficult situation in their home 
country. If Venezuelan immigrants could disproportionately move to the areas which are 
defined as treatment municipalities, this could bias the DiD estimates. As mentioned earlier, by 
using a DiD design, the objective is not to explain all the changes in violence in the country, 
just the different trends between the treatment and control groups. Nevertheless, if there is a 
disproportional flow of Venezuelans that move the treatment areas, this could bias the 
estimations. 
In 2014, only 23,573 Venezuelans were living in Colombia, while in 2019, 1,488,373 
Venezuelans were living in Colombia (Migración Colombia 2020).  
The map below (Map 2) shows the estimations of the concentration of immigrants from 
Venezuela at a municipality level in Colombia. The red color indicates more than 10,000 
immigrants per municipalities, dark orange indicates between 1,000 and 10,000 immigrants, 
light orange indicates between 500 and 1,000, dark gray indicates between 100 and 500 
immigrants and the light gray color indicates that there are less than 100 immigrants from 
Venezuela in the municipality.  
To test whether immigration could affect the DiD analysis, I redo the analysis without the 
municipalities with a large number of immigrants from Venezuela. I first redo the analysis 
without the municipalities with more than 40,000 immigrants from Venezuela (the ones listed 
as the top 8 municipalities in Table 3). 
Secondly, I repeat the analysis without the municipalities with more than 10,000 immigrants 
(the once that are in red in figure 1 and are listed in Table 3). Finally, I redo the analysis without 
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a bigger sample of municipalities in Colombia with immigration from Venezuela. I now use the 
top 60 municipalities in Colombia with Venezuelan immigration, all the municipalities with 
noticeable migration, and exclude them from the analysis (see the table in Appendix C for list). 
I redo both the main DiD analysis and the pre-analysis to test the parallel trend assumption as 
the main analysis.  
Map 2 Immigration from Venezuela in Colombia 
 
Figure from Migración Colombia (2020) 
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Table 3 Municipalities with many immigrants from Venezuela 
Municipalities number of immigrants population 
% immigrants to 
population 
Bogotá,D,C, 357667 8281030 4.32 
Cúcuta 93461 674831 13.85 
Barranquilla 86918 1236202 7.03 
Medellín 86201 2549537 3.38 
Cali 55884 2470852 2.26 
Maicao 44251 166603 26.56 
Riohacha 42278 295984 14.28 
Cartagena de Indias 40798 1047005 3.90 
Bucaramanga 37094 528610 7.02 
Santa Marta 35166 515717 6.82 
Valledupar 29165 493367 5.91 
Villa del Rosario 28147 96953 29.03 
Soacha 25159 556268 4.52 
Soledad 23589 683580 3.45 
Arauca 17187 93261 18.43 
Pereira 12156 478892 2.54 
Bello 11812 491182 2.40 
Yopal 10732 152655 7.03 
Floridablanca 10721 267538 4.01 
San Juan del Cesar 1036 39472 2.62 
Fonseca 1013 35205 2.88 
Ciénaga 10128 105510 9.60 
  
I start by redoing the graphical representation of the pre-trend, as shown in Figure 5, 6 and 7. 
The pre-trends are quite similar to the main analysis. They are remarkably parallel, and they 




Figure 5 Graphical representation of pre-trend using a restricted sample 1  
 





Figure 7 Graphical representation of pre-trend using a restricted sample 3  
 
 
I then redo the main differences-in-differences analysis, as one can see in Table 4. All the 
estimations are positive and statistically significant, as in the main analysis. The estimations are 
a bit smaller in size, 9.99 compared to 12.34, for the most restricted sample, which is natural 
since I have excluded a large part of the population (the areas with most immigrants tend to be 
the bigger cities, with some exceptions). This extra analysis shows that the effect that is 
measured in the main analysis cannot be explained by immigration from Venezuela.  
I also do placebo tests and the alternative graphical representation on these restricted samples, 
as one can see in Appendix C. The placebo tests all show results that are similar to the main 





Table 4 Differences-in-differences analysis of homicide rate without municipalities with 
many immigrants from Venezuela 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES full sample restricted sample 1 restricted sample 2 restricted sample 3 
     
DiD 12.34** 12.32** 12.32** 9.991** 
 (5.461) (5.452) (5.452) (4.652) 
Constant 25.23*** 25.10*** 25.10*** 24.83*** 
 (2.232) (2.264) (2.264) (2.391) 
     
Observations 11,220 11,140 11,140 10,660 
R-squared 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.033 
Number of muni 1,122 1,114 1,114 1,066 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Department Department Department Department 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.2 Definition of treatment 
The treatment definition is based on cultivation status, and despite the fact that some areas have 
more cultivation than others, I still have to choose a cutoff for what is included in the treatment 
and control groups. This definition is especially important since I am using seizure data that 
might not be perfectly correlated with the actual cultivation, particularly on the lower end of 
cultivation. To ensure that the cutoff choice is not essential for the results, I perform robustness 
tests where I change the cutoff for the treatment status. I will start by widening the definition 
of treatment status. In the main analysis, I defined the treatment group as the municipalities that 
had registered coca cultivation all the 4 years before the shock. I will now use broader 
definitions where it is sufficient that there was registered coca cultivation in at least some of 
the 4 years before the shock. 
Group 2 has a treatment group that is somewhat larger than the treatment group in the main 
analysis. For Group 2 there only has to been registered coca cultivation in 3 of the 4 last years 
before the shock (see Appendix B for the full list of municipalities). Group 2 treatment contains 
119 municipalities, while the corresponding control group contains 1,004 municipalities.  
Group 3 is a bigger treatment group where there has to be registered coca cultivation in 2 of the 
4 last years before the shock (see appendix for the full list of municipalities). Group 3 treatment 
contains 169 municipalities and group 2 control contains 954 municipalities. 
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Group 4 is the largest treatment group containing 237 municipalities (886 municipalities in the 
control group) where there has only been registered coca cultivation in one of the 4 last years 
before the shock (see appendix for the full list of municipalities).  As the treatment groups get 
larger, more municipalities with little cultivation are included, so the effect size will likely be 
smaller. 
I re-run the DiD analysis using the alternative treatment groups with the same outcome variable 
and equation (1) as the main analysis. The results are shown in the table below (Table 5). The 
estimations are shown both when clustering at the municipality level and the department level. 
The estimations are statistically significant (at 1 % or 5 % level) and positive, as in the main 
analysis. The results show that the choice of cutoff is not essential for the results. As expected, 
the effects are slightly smaller; whereas the main estimation is 12.34, the estimates for group 2 
are 11.34, for group 3 are 10.46 and for group 4 are 7.11. The smaller effects correspond the 
wider treatment definitions that now include municipalities with lower presences of coca 
cultivation.  
Table 5 Differences-in-differences estimation using alternative treatment definitions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES group 2 group 3 group 4 
    
DiD 11.34***   
 (3.611)   
DiD  10.46***  
  (3.090)  
DiD   7.108** 
   (2.647) 
Constant 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 
 (2.217) (2.206) (2.205) 
    
Observations 11,220 11,220 11,220 
R-squared 0.038 0.039 0.036 
Number of muni 1,122 1,122 1,122 
Municipality FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Cluster Department Department Department 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I redo the graphical analysis for the different treatment and control groups to see if visually they 
have parallel pre-trends. Below I have graphed the trends, including the pre-trends for the 
homicide rate by treatment and control group (Figure 8, 9 and 10). All three different definitions 
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of treatment and control groups show a parallel trend before the shock in 2016 (indicated by 
the red vertical line) as the original treatment group does. I have graphed the treatment and 
control groups using an alternative technique, as one can see in Appendix D. The graph presents 
the change in the average homicide rate in the treatment and the control group from one year to 
another. The graphs present a similar result to the main analysis where one can see that for the 
first years, the change is small, and from 2016 there is a more considerable positive change for 
all the three groups. 
 





Figure 9 Graphical representation of pre-trend group 3 
 
 




7.3 Study of areas close to the border with Venezuela 
An alternative method for testing the robustness of the analysis, is to decrease and concentrate 
the full sample (while keeping the original definition of treatment and control). The assumption 
behind a concentrated sample is that municipalities that are close to the border with Venezuela 
should be more affected by the positive shock from Venezuela due to transportation costs (it 
takes time, money, and risk to transport the illegal goods).  
Looking at the road network in Colombia, it is not apparent how much the transportation time 
(and cost) increases in the different areas.  As one can see from the map (Map 3), there are no 
main roads in the eastern part of the country, and therefore it is likely that the commodities from 
Venezuela arrive from the North and North East and will pass through the country to arrive in 
the South. Since Colombia is a large country, there are big differences in transportation 
distances. Whereas Cúcuta is only a 2-hour drive from El Tachira, Venezuela, Bogotá is 14 
hours away and Pasto 28 hours away (Google calculation 2020). 
It is possible to calculate the travel distance from the border to each city, but most production 
occurs in rural areas, where road quality can be poor. Therefore, it is not sure that it is faster to 
get to a little village far outside Bogotá, than a rural area outside of Calí because the speed of 
transportation is faster and easier on highways. I will assume that everything else being equal, 
on average, a municipality in the South West is further away from the Venezuelan border than 
a municipality in the North East. With this assumption, I simplify by comparing the departments 
that are adjacent to the border with the departments that are adjacent to departments that are 
adjacent to the border. 
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Map 3 Main road network in Colombia 
 
Map from Instituto Nacional de Vías (Colombian Ministry of Transportation) 
On the map below (Map 4), it is possible to see the departments' proximity by color code: the 
areas in red are nearest and adjacent to the Venezuelan border, and the once in blue color is 
further away. The departments adjacent to the Venezuelan border are La Guajira, Cesar, Norte 
de Santander, Boyacá, Arauca, Vichada, and Guainia (in red on the map below). The 
departments adjacent to these departments are Magdalena, Bolivar, Antioquia, Santander, 
Caldas, Cundinamarca, Casanare, Meta, Guaviare, Vaupés (in pink on the map below). 
I will now redo the analysis using the different subsamples, first, with the departments adjacent 
to the border hereafter, the red sample. Then the departments that are adjacent to the border and 
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the once that are adjacent to departments that are adjacent to the border, the red and pink sample. 
I start with the red sample, and I then do the pink and red sample. 
Map 4 Departments in Colombia by proximity to the Venezuelan border 
 
 
Notes: The map display Colombia with department borders. The color represents the distance to the Venezuelan 
border. The red color represents the department directly adjacent to the Venezuelan border. Blue represents 





I redo the DiD analysis for the different sub-samples. The analysis is done by clustering both at 
the municipality level and department level. See table 6 below for the results. All the effects 
are positive. The effects are statistically significant for the red and pink samples, but not for the 
red sample, where the sample consisted of only the departments adjacent to the border. The 
effect is nearly double the original analysis's size from 12.34 to 20.23 for the pink and red 
sample. It makes sense that the effect increases as the sample get more concentrated on the area 
affected. Still, this does not explain why the sample nearest the border, the red sample is not 
statistically significant (or only statistically significant at 10 %). The smaller the sample, the 
less power there is in the analysis, and this may explain why the analysis done to the red sample 
is not statically significant. Due to the small numbers of cluster, I re-run the analysis with wild 
clustering errors. These results (as one can see in appendix), show no statistical significant 
effects, with p-values of 0.12 and 0.232 for the pink and red and red sample respectively. 
Therefore, this sub-analysis does not seem to be suitable for inference. One potential reason for 
the violation of the DID assumption could be that the areas close to the border generally can 
experience more violence, for other reasons than cocaine production, such as smuggling.   
 
Table 6 Differences-in-differences analysis of the homicide rate on red and pink subsample 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES red and pink red 
   
DiD 20.23** 37.82* 
 (9.368) (16.82) 
Constant 19.72*** 17.31*** 
 (3.090) (1.972) 
   
Observations 7,120 2,230 
R-squared 0.029 0.048 
Number of muni 712 223 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Cluster Department Department 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Below I have graphed the trends, including the pre-trends for the homicide rate by treatment 
and control group for the red sample. Visually the graph does not show a parallel trend before 
the shock in 2016 (indicated by the red vertical line). The graph does show a change between 
37 
 
the treatment and control groups after the shock in 2016. Whereas the mean homicide rate in 
the treatment group increases after the shock, the mean homicide rate in the control group is 
stable after the shock until 2018, where it increases a bit. The lack of similar trends can also 
explain why the DiD estimation was not significant; it did not have a prerequired parallel trend.   
In the alternative graphical representation, as one can see in Appendix E, I have graphed the 
treatment and control groups using an alternative technique. The graph presents the change in 
the average homicide rate in the treatment and the control group from one year to another. One 
cannot see the evident change as in the main analysis. However, one can see that for the first 
years the change is small and from 2015 there is a more considerable positive change, though 
not statically significant. 
The placebo test, as one can see in Appendix E, does not show any significant results. Yet, the 
visual representation in figure 11 still violates the required parallel trends.  





I then redo the same tests for the red and pink sample. Below I have graphed the trends, 
including the pre-trends for the homicide rate by treatment and control group for the red and 
pink sample (Figure 12). The pre-trends are quite similar to the main analysis, and they are 
parallel. They display, as in the main analysis, a jump in the treated sample after the shock in 
2016. It is interesting to note that the sample that had a more similar pre-trend was also the 
sample with an effect.  
In the alternative graphical representation, as one can see in Appendix E, I have graphed the 
treatment and control groups using an alternative technique. The graph presents the change in 
the average homicide rate in the treatment and the control group from one year to another, and 
one can see that for the first years, the change is small, and from 2016 there is a more 
considerable positive change, as in the main analysis. 
The placebo test, as one can see in Appendix E, does not show any significant results.  







In this thesis, I have studied the relationship between violence and cocaine production to 
investigate whether a positive shock to cocaine production leads to more violence. Using an 
exogenous price shock in the cocaine market, I have investigated the effect on violence in 
cocaine-producing areas. The price shock originates from a shock to the exchange rate between 
the currencies of Colombia and Venezuela, which in turn is caused by hyperinflation in 
Venezuela due to oil shock and poorly manipulation of exchange rates. This shock affects the 
price of an input into the cocaine production, the price of trafficked gasoline.  
I have used a quasi-experimental research design to study the impact of the supply shock on 
violence. I am performing a Differences-in-differences (DiD) analysis between areas with high-
intensity and low-intensity coca cultivation, assuming (and testing for) similar trends before 
and after the economic shock. I combine data on coca cultivation and homicides, two relatively 
reliable data sources in a field of research with many unknowns, and a general lack of 
information. The positive supply shock leads to more violence in coca producing areas 
compared to non-producing areas. The impact of the shock in the treatment group is an increase 
of 12.34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Even for a violent country like Colombia, the 
number is quite high. The average homicide rate in the whole sample is about 26 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants, which implies that the effect of the supply shock is equivalent to a 50% 
increase in the number of murders in the average municipality. The results are robust to various 
tests, as controlling for immigration, excluding big cities and distance from the border.   
The results indicate that when it becomes cheaper to produce cocaine, there is more violence in 
the production areas. Since violence and drug production are both highly unwanted, the 
implication should be to make sure that it does not become cheaper to produce cocaine. It also 
implies that the decriminalization of drug production would lead to more violence. However, 
legalization would still be an option because it would acquire an entirely new set of intuitions 
and regulations that could prevent violence. Still, "turning a blind eye" on drug production 
would not be productive.  It also means that the government should, in the future, be watchful 
for price changes that could affect the production to avoid more unnecessary violence.  
The thesis also highlights the underlying poor economic conditions for the people involved in 
the industry, such as the farmers. Improving the actual economic conditions for poor people 
would be a start to avoid such high levels of violence. If one could use some of the vast sums 
of money allocated to fighting drugs into the education system, more children could get a decent 
education and jobs with modest salaries. Fair salaries in legal activities would increase the 
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opportunity cost and thus making fewer people prone to get into the illegal business, and thereby 
decrease the level of violence.  
For future research, it would be interesting to study the peace agreement, which was another 
major phenomenon in Colombia that happened in 2016 (UNODC & Government of Colombia 
2017). One could ask if there is any way the peace agreement could be the leading cause of 
more violence. It is clear that this is not the intention of the agreement; the intention is of course 
peace, the opposite of violence. However, the peace agreement might have some unintended 
consequences that could lead to more violence.  One crucial factor of the peace agreement was 
that the FARC guerrillas had do give up the territories that they had used to produce coca and 
cocaine, and they did (UNODC & Government of Colombia 2017). The abandoning of territory 
might lead to violence in the competition over territories, either between the government and 
the illegal armed groups or between different illegal armed groups. Nevertheless, these potential 
fights over vacant sites cannot explain the substantial results for the complete analysis, as the 
FARC guerilla only occupied some of the counties. In the future, it would be interesting to 
study the regions occupied by FARC and its effects on violence. 
Furthermore, I did not get access to geo-referenced data in time, so I used seizure data. It would 
be interesting, in the future, to check whether my findings are robust to this type of data. 
It would also be useful to study the shifts in demand and supply from the corona crisis in the 
future. The corona crisis has shut down many countries, including Colombia, and the travel and 
commerce restriction makes it hard to transport drugs to consumer countries. Since there is a 
lag in time from cultivation and production to consumption (about two years from the 
cultivation of coca leaves in Colombia to consumption in the U.S.), it should be possible to 
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Table A.1 Differences-in- differences analysis of the effect of the effect of the price shock on 
homicide rates cluster at municipality level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
DiD 12.34*** 12.34*** 12.34*** 12.34*** 
 (4.326) (4.328) (4.326) (4.327) 
Constant 23.46*** 23.27*** 25.43*** 25.23*** 
 (0.711) (0.928) (0.246) (0.701) 
     
Observations 11,220 11,220 11,220 11,220 
Number of muni 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
Municipality FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Cluster Municipality Municipality Municipality Municipality 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A. 2 Differences-in-differences analysis of the effect of the effect of the price shock on 
homicide rates with wild clustering 
      
  without controls some controls some controls Main result  
      
DiD 12.33859*** 12.33859** 12.33859** 12.33859**  
 (1.932392) (5.459306) (5.461011) (5.461254)  
 [0.000] [0.024] [0.031] [0.024]  
  {0.04004004}  {0.03003003} 
 
   
 
  
Observations 11220 11220 11220 11220  
Municipality 
FE 
NO NO YES NO  
Year FE NO NO YES YES  
Cluster NO YES YES YES  
Notes: I cluster at department level (clustered standard errors in (), clustered p-values in [], and wild clustered  
p-values in {}). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
      
      




Table A. 3 Placebo tests with wild clustering 








placebo year 2014 
placebo year 
2015 
      
DiD 0.692 1.251 -1.512 -4.330* -5.440* 
 (4.255) (2.550) (2.450) (2.542) (3.077) 
 [0.872]  [0.627]  [0.542]  [0.098]  [0.087]  
 {0.822} {0.606} {0.534} {0.126} {0.104} 
      
Observations 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 
 
Notes: I cluster at department level (clustered standard errors in (), clustered p-values in [], and wild clustered p-values 
in {}). Year fixed effects included.  Municipality fixed effects included, but not for wild cluster 
⁎ p < 0.10.  
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.      
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.      








Table B. 1 List of municipalities in the main treatment sample 





















































Río de Oro 
Samaniego 
San Andres de Tumaco 
San Francisco 
San José del Guaviare 
San José del Palmar 
San Luis 
San Miguel 
San Pablo de Borbur 
San Vicente del Caguán 
Santa Bárbara 





















Table B. 2 List of municipalities in different treatment groups 
List of municipalities in different treatment 
groups  
by municipality code     
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
      
5040 5040 5031 5031 
5045 5045 5040 5040 
5120 5107 5045 5045 
5361 5120 5107 5107 
5480 5134 5120 5120 
5652 5172 5134 5134 
5660 5250 5172 5154 
5790 5361 5234 5172 
5837 5480 5250 5234 
5854 5495 5361 5250 
5887 5585 5480 5284 
13160 5628 5495 5315 
13670 5652 5585 5361 
13688 5660 5628 5380 
18150 5790 5652 5425 
18247 5837 5660 5475 
18256 5854 5736 5480 
18592 5887 5756 5495 
18753 13160 5790 5585 
19075 13458 5819 5591 
19100 13670 5837 5628 
19130 13688 5854 5649 
19212 15572 5858 5652 
19256 18150 5885 5660 
19450 18247 5887 5679 
19473 18256 5890 5736 
19517 18410 13160 5756 
19809 18592 13458 5790 
20614 18610 13473 5819 
23466 18753 13490 5837 
23807 19001 13670 5854 
27615 19022 13688 5858 
27660 19050 13744 5885 
50325 19075 15572 5887 
50350 19100 18094 5890 
50370 19110 18150 5893 
50450 19130 18205 5895 
50590 19212 18247 13006 
51 
 
50711 19256 18256 13030 
52079 19318 18410 13042 
52250 19450 18460 13160 
52385 19473 18592 13458 
52390 19517 18610 13473 
52490 19532 18753 13490 
52520 19533 18756 13600 
52540 19622 19001 13654 
52612 19780 19022 13667 
52621 19809 19050 13670 
52678 20614 19075 13683 
52696 23466 19100 13688 
52699 23682 19110 13744 
52835 23807 19130 13810 
54206 23855 19142 15572 
54250 27361 19212 15681 
54498 27413 19256 17662 
54720 27430 19318 18001 
54800 27615 19355 18094 
54810 27660 19364 18150 
68101 27800 19418 18205 
68385 50325 19450 18247 
76109 50330 19473 18256 
76233 50350 19517 18410 
76364 50370 19532 18460 
81065 50400 19533 18592 
86320 50450 19548 18610 
86568 50590 19622 18753 
86569 50683 19693 18756 
86571 50711 19698 19001 
86573 52079 19780 19022 
86757 52250 19807 19050 
86865 52256 19809 19075 
86885 52385 19821 19100 
95001 52390 20011 19110 
95025 52399 20178 19130 
95200 52427 20614 19137 
99773 52473 20770 19142 
  52490 23466 19212 
  52520 23682 19256 
  52540 23807 19290 
  52612 23855 19318 
  52621 27025 19355 
  52678 27077 19364 
52 
 
  52696 27361 19392 
  52699 27413 19397 
  52835 27430 19418 
  54001 27615 19450 
  54003 27660 19455 
  54128 27800 19473 
  54206 27810 19517 
  54245 47001 19532 
  54250 50325 19533 
  54344 50330 19548 
  54385 50350 19622 
  54498 50370 19693 
  54670 50400 19698 
  54720 50450 19743 
  54800 50590 19780 
  54810 50683 19807 
  68101 50711 19809 
  68250 52036 19821 
  68385 52079 20011 
  68773 52227 20013 
  76109 52233 20178 
  76233 52250 20310 
  76364 52256 20550 
  81065 52260 20614 
  86320 52385 20621 
  86568 52390 20710 
  86569 52399 20770 
  86571 52411 23466 
  86573 52427 23580 
  86757 52435 23682 
  86865 52473 23807 
  86885 52490 23855 
  95001 52520 27025 
  95015 52540 27077 
  95025 52612 27150 
  95200 52621 27250 
  99773 52678 27361 
   52696 27413 
   52699 27425 
   52835 27430 
   54001 27450 
   54003 27491 
   54128 27580 
   54206 27615 
53 
 
   54245 27660 
   54250 27745 
   54261 27800 
   54344 27810 
   54385 41001 
   54498 41006 
   54553 47001 
   54670 50251 
   54720 50325 
   54800 50330 
   54810 50350 
   68101 50370 
   68190 50400 
   68250 50450 
   68255 50568 
   68385 50577 
   68573 50590 
   68615 50683 
   68773 50689 
   68861 50711 
   76109 52036 
   76126 52079 
   76233 52227 
   76364 52233 
   76834 52240 
   81065 52250 
   86001 52254 
   86320 52256 
   86568 52260 
   86569 52356 
   86571 52385 
   86573 52390 
   86757 52399 
   86865 52411 
   86885 52418 
   95001 52427 
   95015 52435 
   95025 52473 
   95200 52490 
   97161 52520 
   99001 52540 
   99624 52573 
   99773 52612 
    52621 
54 
 
    52678 
    52687 
    52696 
    52699 
    52786 
    52835 
    54001 
    54003 
    54128 
    54206 
    54245 
    54250 
    54261 
    54344 
    54385 
    54498 
    54553 
    54670 
    54720 
    54800 
    54810 
    66572 
    68101 
    68190 
    68250 
    68255 
    68385 
    68397 
    68573 
    68615 
    68720 
    68745 
    68773 
    68861 
    70265 
    73168 
    76100 
    76109 
    76126 
    76233 
    76250 
    76275 
    76364 
    76670 
55 
 
    76834 
    81065 
    86001 
    86320 
    86568 
    86569 
    86571 
    86573 
    86757 
    86865 
    86885 
    91001 
    94001 
    94663 
    95001 
    95015 
    95025 
    95200 
    97161 
    99001 
    99524 
    99624 








Appendix C  
Table C. 1 Top 60 municipalities in Colombia after number of immigrants from Venezuela 








Cartagena de Indias 40798 
Bucaramanga 37094 
Santa Marta 35166 
Valledupar 29165 
























Los Patios 5144 






























Placebo test for restricted samples by of immigration from Venezuela 
Table C. 2 Differences-in- differences placebo-estimation restricted sample 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      
DiD 0.646 1.185 -1.576 -4.389* -5.481* 
 (4.240) (2.530) (2.433) (2.530) (3.071) 
Constant 25.10*** 25.10*** 25.10*** 25.10*** 25.10*** 
 (1.638) (1.638) (1.640) (1.641) (1.640) 
      
Observations 6,684 6,684 6,684 6,684 6,684 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 
Number of 
muni 
1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 1,114 
Municipality 
FE 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table C. 3 Differences-in- differences placebo-estimation restricted sample 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      
DiD 0.619 1.133 -1.591 -4.405* -5.517* 
 (4.229) (2.519) (2.425) (2.529) (3.069) 
Constant 25.08*** 25.08*** 25.08*** 25.08*** 25.08*** 
 (1.656) (1.655) (1.658) (1.659) (1.658) 
      
Observations 6,600 6,600 6,600 6,600 6,600 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 
Number of 
muni 
1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table C. 4 Differences-in- differences placebo-estimation restricted sample 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      
DiD 1.032 1.058 -1.395 -4.614 -5.234 
 (4.419) (2.706) (2.600) (2.729) (3.220) 
Constant 24.83*** 24.83*** 24.83*** 24.83*** 24.83*** 
 (1.720) (1.720) (1.723) (1.725) (1.723) 
      
Observations 6,396 6,396 6,396 6,396 6,396 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
Number of 
muni 
1,066 1,066 1,066 1,066 1,066 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Alternative graphical representations 
Figure C. 1 Change in the average homicide rate in the treatment and the control group 




Figure C. 2 Change in the average homicide rate in the treatment and the control group 
restricted sample 2 
 
Figure C. 3 Change in the average homicide rate in the treatment and the control group 







Table D. 1 Differences-in- differences placebo-estimation group 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES placebo year 2011 placebo year 2012 placebo year 2013 placebo year 2014 placebo year 2015 
      
DiD -0.649 0.200 -0.741 -2.258 -2.498 
 (2.627) (1.998) (2.175) (2.181) (3.527) 
Constant 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 
 (1.619) (1.616) (1.618) (1.620) (1.619) 
      
Observations 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
Number of muni 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Department Department Department Department Department 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table D. 2 Differences-in- differences placebo-estimation group 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES placebo year 2011 placebo year 2012 placebo year 2013 placebo year 2014 placebo year 2015 
      
DiD -0.206 0.358 -3.391** -4.708** -4.959* 
 (2.704) (2.751) (1.573) (1.833) (2.852) 
Constant 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 
 (1.618) (1.616) (1.628) (1.627) (1.622) 
      
Observations 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.013 
Number of muni 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Department Department Department Department Department 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table D. 3 Differences-in- differences placebo-estimation group 4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES placebo year 2011 placebo year 2012 placebo year 2013 placebo year 2014 placebo year 2015 
      
DiD 0.896 0.680 -3.042** -4.645*** -5.276* 
 (1.896) (1.974) (1.279) (1.544) (2.709) 
Constant 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 25.23*** 
 (1.610) (1.613) (1.633) (1.634) (1.626) 
      
Observations 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 6,732 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014 
Number of muni 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Department Department Department Department Department 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 







    
Figure D. 1 Change in the average homicide rate in the treatment and the control 




Figure D.3 Change in the average homicide rate in the treatment and the control group using group 4 
Figure D. 2 Change in the average homicide rate in the treatment and the control group 








      
 red and pink red 
   
DiD 20.23** 37.82* 
 (9.368) (16.82) 
 [0.046]   [0.066]   
 {0 .12}  {0.232}  
   
Observations 7120 2230 
Notes: I cluster at department level (clustered standard errors in (), clustered p-values in [], and wild 
clustered p-values in {}). Year fixed effects included.  Municipality fixed effects included, but not for 
wild cluster  
⁎ p < 0.10.  
⁎⁎ p < 0.05. 
 
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.  
 
Placebo test for restricted samples by proximity to border 
Table E. 2 Differences-in-differences placebo-estimation on the red subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES placebo year 2011 placebo year 2012 placebo year 2013 placebo year 2014 placebo year 2015 
      
DiD 15.81 19.09* 15.85 21.27 25.24 
 (13.47) (9.024) (10.89) (12.59) (13.34) 
Constant 17.31*** 17.31*** 17.31*** 17.31*** 17.31*** 
 (1.971) (1.972) (1.973) (1.971) (1.971) 
      
Observations 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 2,230 
R-squared 0.019 0.023 0.022 0.027 0.032 
Number of muni 223 223 223 223 223 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Department Department Department Department Department 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E. 3 Differences-in-differences placebo-estimation on red and pink subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      
DiD 10.32 10.90 9.762 10.18 13.97* 
 (10.67) (8.167) (7.474) (7.572) (7.783) 
Constant 19.72*** 19.72*** 19.72*** 19.72*** 19.72*** 
 (3.079) (3.084) (3.101) (3.108) (3.100) 
      
Observations 7,120 7,120 7,120 7,120 7,120 
R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.024 
Number of 
muni 
712 712 712 712 712 
Municipality 
FE 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster Department Department Department Department Department 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 




Figure E. 2 Alternative graphical representation for red and pink subsample 
 
 
